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Abstract
Inner city redevelopment frequently involves the assembly of small lots into bigger ones.
We analyze joint lot development and the influence of coordination and transaction costs of
land assembly on the exercise of the redevelopment option, using Amsterdam micro housing
information for 1832, 1860 and 2015. In all, we have a complete set of building structure and
household characteristics for dwellings on almost 30,000 lots for each of these years.
We  estimate  a  logit  model  to  predict  joint  lot  redevelopment,  based  on  structural
characteristics of lots and dwellings and on social characteristics of their occupants. The
results show that both types of characteristics significantly explain land assembly, and the
regression  coefficients  adhere  to  the  theoretical  land  assembly  literature.  This  paper
contributes importantly to our knowledge of the specific land parcel and structural physical
characteristics that impact redevelopment. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study
the joint characteristics of the potentially combinable lots, and to document and quantify the
role of social characteristics in land assembly.
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I. Introduction
In historic city centers, where many existing lots are too small  for optimal modern uses,
redevelopment  often  involves  a  combination  of  lots  and  owners,  creating  coordination
problems and transaction costs that are likely to influence the exercise of the redevelopment
option. This land assembly problem has been studied quite extensively, both theoretically and
empirically. However, these studies always analyze single lots instead of lots in combination.1
Yet land assembly involves the combination of two or more lots. It is therefore likely that not
only the characteristics of individual parcels are relevant, but also the joint characteristics of
the relevant lots, which determine the possible results of the assembly.
We look at  the micro urban form of Amsterdam at three far-removed moments in
time: 1832, 1860 and 2015. In doing this, we make three main contributions to the urban
economics literature. 
First,  we  analyze  the  redevelopment  of  urban  lots  jointly  with  their  neighbors,
explicitly considering the coordination problems this entails. 
Second,  we  explore  the  very  long-run  dynamics  of  urban  (re)development  at  the
micro level,  which is  important  for understanding the micro-forces that  shape cities.  The
urban landscape at any point in time is a legacy of development decisions taken over the
decades and centuries before. In effect, we investigate whether land owners in the distant past
already – implicitly or explicitly – incorporated seemingly modern concepts like highest and
best use in their decision making concerning redevelopment.
Third,  we not only study the characteristics of lots  and dwellings, but also of the
people owning and occupying them. When lot owners have matching social characteristics,
this possibly reduces coordination costs between these owners, and could make it easier for
them to combine their lots if that would make economic sense. Conversely, when owners are
also the occupiers of dwellings, joint redevelopment may become costlier, since it necessarily
creates  moving costs.  This  would  reduce  the  likelihood of  assembly.  To  our  knowledge,
owner  and  occupier  characteristics  of  individual  lots  have  not  yet  been  studied  when
analyzing land assembly issues.
The empirical analysis in the paper starts with the 1832 cross section of lots in the
historic city, i.e. all lots located within Amsterdam’s famous half-moon shaped center, which
1See,  for  example,  Eckart  (1985),  Strange  (1995),  Menezes  and  Pitchford  (2004),  Cunningham  (2013,
Hornbeck and Keniston (2014), and Brooks and Lutz (2016).
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effectively made up the complete city at that time. We estimate a model that predicts the land
assembly that occurred between 1832 and 1860, and between 1832 and 2015. This model is
based on structural variables, pertaining to the physical characteristics of lots and buildings,
and social variables, i.e. characteristics of lot owners and/or occupiers. 
Using this model, without the social dimension, we can explain 45 percent of the land
assembly that went on between 1832 and 1860. This increases to 53 percent if we include
social  variables such as the profession and religion of the inhabitants of the dwellings in
1832. 
This same model, employing quite limited data from 1832 only, is able to explain up
to 27 percent of the cross sectional variation in land assembly activity in Amsterdam’s city
center in the subsequent 183 years, through 2015. Regarding the effects of the individual
variables, we find these to be smaller over this long time period than for the 28 years before
1860. Not very surprisingly, the 1832 owners’ characteristics cease to have a significant effect
on land assembly over the much longer time period.
In the remainder of this paper we first discuss the literature regarding the assembly
and redevelopment of urban land. We subsequently present the data, data sources and variable
definitions for the ensuing regressions, as well as statistics regarding these variables. We then
discuss  the  logit  and  spatial  autoregressive  models  we  employ  to  predict  Amsterdam’s
redevelopment  dynamics  between  1832  and  2015,  and  we  provide  the  results  of  these
analyses. A final section concludes.
II. Literature
Cities grow and evolve both by developing land around the city and by redeveloping land
within it. Often, redevelopment takes place from the inside out, starting in the urban core.
This is the motivation for our study of historic urban Amsterdam. It builds on a small but
solid strand of literature aiming to understand when and how urban land is redeveloped and
assembled and what the consequences are for land values. 
The early literature regarding the economic analysis of urban redevelopment looks
mostly at the relationship between the values of the existing structures, demolition costs and
vacant land to explain the teardown and redevelopment of urban properties. The theoretical
foundation for this literature was laid in three papers –  Brueckner (1980), Wheaton (1982)
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and Braid (2001) – while the seminal empirical paper that first tested these ideas was by
Rosenthal and Helsley (1994). They apply the theoretical economic foundation to data of
residential property transactions in Vancouver. Their main conclusion is that redevelopment
of a property happens when the value of land in its current use is lower than the price of
vacant land at that location.
Munneke (1996) models  the probability  of the redevelopment  of a commercial  or
industrial  property,  and tests  the  model’s  prediction  by  employing a  reduced-form probit
model on property transactions data for the Chicago metropolitan area. His findings support
those of Rosenthal and Helsley (1994). More recently, Dye and McMillen (2007) do the same
for teardowns of homes in Chicago, also employing a probit model. 
Titman (1985) and Capozza and Li (1994) choose a different approach, and model the
occurrence of (re)development  as  the exercise of an option under  uncertainty concerning
future property rents. Capozza and Li use this model to analyze the decision to change the use
of  –  or  to  redevelop  –  urban  land.  The  recent  literature  concerning  urban  property
redevelopment is modeled as the exercise of an option that is embedded in the ownership of
properties.  Examples  are  Clapp  and  Salavei  (2010),  Clapp,  Jou  and  Lee  (2012),  Clapp,
Eichholtz and Lindenthal (2013), and Munneke and Womack (2015, 2016). 
One important characteristic of this literature is that it focuses on individual properties,
implicitly in isolation.2 But city centers typically have a legacy grid of lots that were large
enough for historic uses, but that could well be too small for modern ones. Realistically,
redevelopment must involve the assembly of different lots into one. 
This land assembly issue traces a different strand in the literature. It has been studied
theoretically and empirically, explicitly addressing the coordination and transaction costs that
are likely to emerge when different lots with different owners are jointly redeveloped. The
land  assembly  literature  has  not  particularly  focused  on  real  option  theory.  Though  in
principle that theory is relevant for land assembly, as with the other papers in this strand of
the literature, we do not seek to test real option theory (which we presume is valid). One
reason is that we do not have data on option value, as our valuation data reflects only the
usage or occupancy rental  value of the existing building.  This reflects  equilibrium in the
space market, but does not reflect the redevelopment option value that is priced in the land or
asset  market.  Furthermore,  there is  a  rich set  of issues,  not inconsistent  with real  option
2 Dye and McMillen (2007) and Munneke and Womack (2015, 2016) do employ  variables that  measure a
property relative to the lot, building area, and age of the properties around it to help predict redevelopment.
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theory but not particularly pertaining to it, that arise particularly regarding land assembly. The
present paper is focused on these physical and economic issues. 
A  key  result  stemming  from  the  theoretical  literature  is  that  various  market
imperfections lead to below-optimal land assembly (O’Flaherty 1994, Strange 1995). The
theoretical papers also make predictions on value. One of the main predictions is that the
square meter price for smaller lots is higher than for larger lots (Eckart 1985, Strange 1995).
Empirical studies testing these theoretical predictions are sparse. Cunningham (2013)
investigates value effects and finds that land that was sold into a successful assembly yields
an average premium of 17 percent. In line with the theoretical predictions, both Cunningham
and Fu, McMillen and Sommerville (2002) find that the square meter price of lots sold in
assembly falls with their size. The latter also find that final sellers into an assembly receive a
premium relative to early sellers.
Recently,  Brooks  and  Lutz  (2016)  focus  on  the  question  of  whether  enough  land
assembly takes place. To sustain economic growth in cities, urban land should be developed
to its highest and best use, and that involves optimal lot size. If there is insufficient land
assembly, the economic development of the city will be hampered. Brooks and Lutz analyze
lots in Los Angeles County, comparing the prices of land sold into assembly with those of
land on which the structure was torn down after purchase.  They find a 15 to 40 percent
premium for the former, which suggests that urban land markets are subject to frictions that
reduce assembly.
Building upon Brooks and Lutz (2016), we argue that for adjacent lots to be jointly
redeveloped, the value of the assembled lot needs to exceed the value of the to-be-assembled
lots after deducting all assembly-related costs. Only if the value of the assembled property
Vassembled  less the construction cost of the new structure K and the cost related to the assembly
process δ is bigger than the value of the to-be-assembled properties, will a developer consider
an assembly: V assembled − K − δ>∑
n=1
n=N
Pn , where the summation refers to the value of all the
properties being assembled (and we note that these need not be vacant lots but might have
viable structures that are no longer the highest and best use of the lots). 
The following data section suggest variables that can serve as proxies for the potential
net present value of the construction project,  Vassembled – K,  as well as  the assembly related
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costs, δ, and the value of the to-be-assembled properties, P. This data will provide the basis of
our empirical study. 
III. Data
To study (re)development activity in the city of Amsterdam over a long span of history, we
employ data covering the universe of all lots and buildings in central Amsterdam at three
points in time: 1832, 1860, and 2015. We have cadastral maps with underlying information
for each of these years. These maps are effectively urban geographic information systems,
organizing detailed demographic and dwelling structure information in a spatial way.
Detailed property maps for the entire Netherlands were available for the first time in
1832. When the French annexed the Netherlands in 1810, they introduced French land laws
and the French tax system, which relied on an accurate and complete cadastral system in the
modern sense. In 1811, property surveying work according to French standards commenced
in the Netherlands.  After  Napoleon's  defeat  and the end of the French occupation of  the
Netherlands in 1813, the land tax code and cadaster remained in operation and surveying
continued until the entire country was measured by 1831 (Kain and Baigent, 1992). The 1832
cadastral map is a result of that effort.
This map and the data underlying it provide extensive information on all dwellings in
the city of Amsterdam for 1832: 28,365 lots, on which 30,047 individual buildings were built.
The data’s  current  source  is  Amsterdam’s  land register  records,  digitized by the  HISGIS
project.3
The records provide a detailed picture of the city in three aspects. First, the historical
maps provide an accurate snapshot of the demarcations of all lots, buildings, streets, canals
within the city walls, and also of the then still undeveloped hinterland. Using GIS techniques,
we can observe which of the lots have been assembled over time. Also we can calculate each
lot’s  size  and  shape,  the  length  of  its  perimeter,  its  proximity  to  water  and  streets,  the
building’s footprint, and the developed area of the lot. These hedonic attributes allow us to
partially control for property quality when estimating marginal prices of attributes associated
with  the  assembly  of  properties.  Using  these  maps,  we  can  also  make  inferences  about
3These data have previously been used by Lesger and Van Leeuwen (2012).
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possible values  (Vassembled) for any lot combinations by comparing the lot's shape to the shapes
of each of its neighboring tracts.
Second,  the  records  provide  information  on each  lot’s  owner's  full  name,  current
address at street level, and occupation. This information sheds some light on the social status
of all property owners in Amsterdam in 1832. We will subsequently also use it to proxy for
coordination problems resulting from the fact that joint lot development involves different
owners. The more different these owners are socially, the bigger these problems are likely to
be. Social ties are hypothesized to mitigate the assembly-related costs, δ. 
Third, for each lot, an estimate of the market rental yield is reported that has been
individually produced and recorded for tax purposes by the city of Amsterdam (Lesger and
Van Leeuwen, 2013)4. This rental information is available for rental dwellings and owner-
occupied dwellings alike, so it does not entail rents that were actually paid, but rather the
rents that could have been generated on the basis of the location and structure of the lot and
the dwelling(s) built on it. Arguably, this rental value, which we designate as Pexisting, depends
on  actual  rental  values.  Importantly,  as  noted  previously,  Pexisting reflects  only  the
usage/occupancy  value  of  the  existing  building,  generally  excluding  the  redevelopment
option value that might reside in the ownership of the property asset (which includes the land
value). Observable rents derive from equilibrium in the space market or rental market, not
directly or independently from the property asset market.
The  next  available  cadastral  map  is  from  1860.  Most  importantly,  the  structural
information on the built  environment is  updated in this map, providing us with a second
snapshot of lot demarcations, buildings, streets and canals. In the 1860 map, this information
is augmented with social data on all residents (not just the owners) based on the 1851-1853
census, including each occupant's name, and their date and place of birth, occupation and
religion (Fryske Akademy, 2014). The 1860 data does not cover rental values.
Combined, these two data sources provide a unique historic snapshot on the micro-
urban form of a major city in the mid-19th century. We are not aware of any other available
dataset comprising detailed information on building structures, property rents and owner or
occupant characteristics and demographics covering an entire city going that far back, and
providing such a degree of coverage.
4Keverling Buisman and Muller (1979) provide guidance for the use of historical mortgage and land registry
archives.  The  value  assessment  could  be  appealed  by  the  owner  (Kruisinga,  1997),  which  was  probably
beneficial for the quality of the assessment process. Our value observations concern the final valuations.
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We  combine  these  two  historic  datasets  with  information  on  lot  and  building
boundaries  for  today’s  Amsterdam.  This  information  is  from the  modern  Dutch  cadaster
(Kadaster, 2015). It includes data on allowed land use according to current zoning, as well as
the number and type of units within multi-unit structures. Again, we know the exact longitude
and latitude of all lots, buildings, streets and canals, and all the boundaries between them.
Current  buildings  often  span  several  historic  lots  since  cadastral  lot  boundaries  are  not
necessarily merged when land is assembled for larger projects. Using GIS, we identify and
aggregate all lots that jointly host a building and consider the joint lots as the relevant unit of
observation in the subsequent analyses. In effect, we combine the lots for the purpose of this
study. In contrast, in 1832 the newly drawn lot boundaries closely resembled the then-current
economic  realities,  as  all  buildings  stood  on  just  one  parcel.  This  illustrates  that
redevelopment, which evidences an evolution of the highest and best use of the site, has often
entailed the replacement of smaller with larger-footprint structures across the 19th and 20th
centuries.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for core variables describing Amsterdam's built
environment  in  1832 and 2015.  The median  lot  size  for  privately  owned developed lots
increased from 68.5 m2 in  1832 to 105.9 m2  in  2015 reflecting the trend towards  larger-
footprint structures. For buildings, the median footprint rose from 46.1 m2 to 79.5 m2 in the
same time period. While the median percentage of the developed land area in Amsterdam’s
city center did not change much in the last 183 years, the development became more evenly
distributed. The standard deviation decreased slightly from 30.3 percent to 26.6 percent as the
share of both relatively thinly and also fully developed lots dropped somewhat. Despite lots
being merged into larger tracts through the years, the shape of lots does not change in terms
of overall stretch or compactness. The ratio of the perimeter squared over the area does not
differ much between 1832 lots and their modern counterparts. The trend toward larger lots
within finite blocks, however, reduces the number of neighbors per lot somewhat. In 1832, a
lot shared boundaries with on average 4.3 other lots, compared to 3.7 in 2015.
=== insert Table 1 about here ===
Not reported in the table is information about the dwellings’ owners. The ownership
of  Amsterdam's  real  estate  in  1832 was widely  dispersed,  with 60 percent  of  all  owners
possessing only one dwelling, 19.5 percent owning two and 7.9 percent with three. Jointly,
these small-scale  investors  accounted for  59 percent  of  the total  stock.  The three  largest
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private investors together owned about 1 percent of all properties, and the maximum number
of dwellings owned by a single investor was 145.5 
The data for 1832 include estimates of property rents that were made for tax purposes.
For all dwellings, including owner-occupied ones, a market rent was estimated on the basis of
which the owners of the properties were taxed. On the basis of these 1832 rent estimates,
Amsterdam can be roughly structured into four areas. Figure 1 provides a clear picture of
this. 
The medieval core of the city comprises the areas named “Burgwallen Oude Zijde,
Nieuwe Zijde and Nieuwmarkt” in Figure 1. This part of the city featured a mix of relatively
small commercial and residential properties whose property rental estimates were distributed
around the city-wide median but which displayed a large variation. To the West and South of
the core, the belt of three prestigious canals hosted mostly residential lots that were larger,
and had a higher and more homogeneous value than the medieval core.  Beyond the rich
canals, the wedge in the Northwest was home to small and low-value quarters for the working
class, mixed with larger industrial sites. The Southeast of the city had not been fully built-up
in 1832 and property values were at the lower end of the distribution. Very large lots there
still needed to be subdivided for development and some were even used for urban vegetable
gardens.
=== insert Figure 1 about here ===
IV. Physical and Social Characteristics Relevant for Land Assembly
We first  want  to  study  the  predictability  of  urban  redevelopment,  focusing  on  the  joint
redevelopment  of  neighboring  lots.  Joint  redevelopments  are  highly  important  for  the
development dynamics of historic city centers. Such redevelopments are complicated, since
they  involve  economic  decision  making  and  coordination  between  different  owners.  We
employ a logit regression model where the odds in favor of a pair of neighboring lots being
merged for redevelopment are simultaneously explained by structural determinants specific to
these lots and the possible resulting lots after assembly, as well as by measures of social ties
and differences between the lot owners.
5 The municipal government was not a dominant landowner in the part of Amsterdam we study. In 1898, the
city of Amsterdam introduced a system of long-term land lease in the areas that were newly developed after that
year, but that did not pertain to the parcels in our sample.
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Lots  i and  j are defined to be neighbors if their boundaries are not further than 3
meters apart, which allows for redevelopment across the narrow footpaths cutting through
Amsterdam's blocks in 1832. For the 1832-1860 period, a joint development for  i and  j is
recorded whenever a 1860 building links both 1832 lots. For 1832-2015, a joint development
is  observed if  more than half  of  the area of  each 1832 lot  intersects with a  single 2015
cadastral lot or if both lots are connected by a building in 2015. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of land assembly for a typical example block facing the
Herengracht canal, Amsterdam’s most prestigious address since the 17th century. The North-
East side of the block faces the canal, and the South-West faces a back street. The buildings
on  these  back  streets  would  typically  consist  of  stables,  workshops,  and  lower-quality
housing for servants and laborers. The remaining two sides of the block face side streets,
connecting the Herengracht to its neighboring canal. Here, dwellings tended to have shops on
the ground level with residential use above. Lot sizes reflect these differences in quality, with
the larger lots facing the canal. While many lots today still feature the same boundaries as in
1832, a clear trend of forming larger lots by combining multiple smaller lots can be observed.
But in 2015, after almost two centuries of stepwise redevelopment, the lots on the canal were
still the largest ones. Block-wide redevelopments only rarely occurred in Amsterdam.6
=== insert Figure 2 about here ===  
The way lots were combined through time is illustrated further in Figure 3. This graph
displays density plots of lot areas for the 1832 and 2015 cross sections, and it clearly shows
that most of the land assembly took place between very small lots. The solid line depicts the
situation in 1832, when half the lots were smaller than 68.5 square meters. The most common
lots at the time measured around 30 square meters. But due to ongoing land assembly, the
smaller lots got bigger, and by 2015, the median lot size was 106 square meters. The graph
also shows that land assembly among larger lots was rare, and that very large lots of 300
square meters or more remain the exception. 
=== insert Figure 3 about here ===
Based on our  definitions  of  redevelopment,  we  draw maps  of  the  redevelopment
intensity in Amsterdam between 1832 and 1860 and between 1832 and 2015. These maps are
6 The overwhelming majority of redevelopment and assembly was between private persons. Urban renewal at a
large scale did not take place in the center (and thus in our sample of parcels), with two exceptions. The first is
the land on top of and adjacent to the subway, that was built in the 1970s. This follows a track on the east side of
the river Amstel. The second is the former Jewish quarter.
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depicted in Figure 4. The left panel shows redevelopment for the 28 years after 1832. This
mostly shows activity in the medieval central city and in the Jordaan, to the North-West of the
center. A few larger lots have been redeveloped in the East.
The map in the right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows far more redevelopment activity,
and more systematic patterns in its occurrence across the city. Not surprisingly, given the fact
that the eastern parts of the city still had quite a few vacant lots, redevelopment has been
strongest in that area: On the canals to the east of the Amstel river, in the former Jewish
neighborhood, in the Plantage, and in the former eastern harbor district behind the navy yards
in the Northeast. Besides that, we observe much redevelopment in the medieval city center
and in the Western neighborhood called the Jordaan. Even in places that look historic today,
redevelopment behind the facades has been quite extensive, for example in different parts of
the old city  center,  along the inner  side of the Herengracht,  on the Prinsengracht,  in  the
northern parts of the Jordaan, and in the area south of the Rozengracht.
In contrast, redevelopment has been very limited in most blocks on the major canals,
and in the better-quality areas of the Jordaan and the old center. 
=== insert Figure 4 about here ===
For each possible pair of lots, we calculate the combined area, the number of all other
neighboring lots and the sum of the property tax values and the percentage of developed area
(all  in  1832).  The redevelopment  intensity  is  expected to  be high for  pairs  where  initial
building values are low (in terms of absolute building value per square meter), since this
implies a lower strike price for the redevelopment option, and thus greater profitability of
redevelopment.7 The shape of the initial  lots  and the potentially  resulting lots  when they
would be merged is characterized as the ratio of the lot perimeter squared over the lot area.
This “stretch” measure is small for compact shapes like squares or circles and increases for
longer  or  more  irregular  tracts.  Proximity  to  water  is  estimated  by  the  share  of  the  lot
perimeter that is closer than 20 meter to one of Amsterdam's canals.8 
We also incorporate the relative size of one lot in each possible pair to assess whether
size matters in a relative sense. The relative weight of each constituent of a combined lot is
measured by the Herfindahl index9 for lot area. In addition, lots that are not developed to the
7 See, for example, Rosenthal and Helsley, 1994; and Clapp, Eichholtz and Lindenthal, 2013.
8Alternative values for these parameters have been explored in robustness tests.
9Herf. areai,j = (areai/areai,j)2 + (areaj/areai,j)2.
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best use are more likely to be subsequently redeveloped (Munneke, 1996). This motivates the
definition of the binary variable Same use: Whenever the initial use classification of lots i and
j differ, at least one lot is likely to be not at the optimal use for that location. 
The social  ties  and differences  between owners  are  proxied  by a  range of  binary
variables. First, we assess whether pairwise lots are owned by the same person: If that is the
case,  coordination  costs  will  be  minimal,  incentives  perfectly  aligned  and  information
asymmetries do not arise. To a lesser degree, if owners have strong social ties, coordination
between them is expected to be easier. We proxy for these social ties by looking whether
owners are living in the same street or have the same trade.
The religious affiliations of the owners has unfortunately not been recorded in 1832.
For owner-occupied properties, the religious denominations of the heads of households as
reported in the 1851-1853 census serves as a proxy for religious ties between owners. For
rental  properties, the religion of the tenants is presumed to be correlated with that of the
owners. Of course this would not be a perfect correlation, but should hold substantially. The
most  frequent  denominations  were  Dutch  protestant  (38%),  Roman  catholic  (19%)  and
Jewish (7%). 
The systematic persecution and murder of Amsterdam's Jewish population during the
German  occupation  in  1940-45  deeply  scarred  the  city.  Against  the  background  of  the
monstrosity of the Holocaust with millions being killed, the void left in the city's urban fabric
seems an irrelevant aspect. Still, it irreversibly changed the built environment of Amsterdam.
At the end of World War II, the homes of Jews had seen their residents deported to death
camps and were often destroyed themselves  by Amsterdammers scavenging for firewood
during the hunger winter of 1945 (Van der Zee, 1982). For the 1832-2015 time period, we
therefore expect that houses inhabited by Jewish heads of households in 1832 have a higher
likelihood of being jointly redeveloped. For redevelopments between 1832-1860, however,
no such differences are expected.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all variables at the pair-of-neighbors level,
with Panel A providing information for the structural characteristics of lots and dwellings,
and  Panel  B  the  social  characteristics  of  their  occupants.  The  table  shows  that  joint
redevelopment was not very common by 1860, but very common starting sometime after
1860 as it is quite common between 1832 and 2015. Forty-two percent of all 1832 lots had
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been redeveloped in combination with another lot by 2015. Most such lots had the same use
as their neighbors, since we observe same use in 73 percent of lot pairs.
Socially, we observe that 16 percent of neighboring lots have the same owner. If the
owners are not the same, they share the same occupation in 14 percent of all cases, and the
same religion in 33 percent of cases. 
=== insert Table 2 about here ===
V. Modeling redevelopment dynamics
The  range  and  depth  of  the  above  described  data  on  the  physical  and  social
characteristics relevant for land assembly is a unique contribution of this paper, and allows a
pioneering predictive model of land assembly and redevelopment. Combining economic and
social factors, we estimate the following logistic regression equation:
ln( P ( Dev )i , j1 − P ( Dev )i , j )=α+βecon X i , j+β social Social i , j+β spatial Block i , j+ϵi , j ,    (1)
in  which  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  odds  ratio  of  the  probability  P(Dev) of  the  joint
redevelopment of lots  i and  j  is explained by an intercept α and a linear combination of
vectors of economic variables Xi,j, social variables Sociali,j and dummy variables Blocki,j for
each of the city's blocks in 1832. The vectors of regression coefficients are denoted as βecon,
βsocial, and  βspatial   and the error term is ε. Despite finely grained spatial control variables for
each of the 647 blocks in the city, the residuals might not be free of within-blocks spatial
dependence, warranting the use of robust standard errors.  A reduced variant of the equation
leaving out the social factors is additionally estimated for both time periods, leading to 4 sets
of regression estimates in total.
The  model  described  in  Equation  (1)  above  is  descriptive  in  nature,  and  quite
parsimonious by necessity due to data limitations. To test the  robustness of the results, we
therefore do the analysis also by employing a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model.  Spatial
models aim to account for unobserved but spatially correlated variables more explicitly than
dummy variables for each block. To rule out such unobserved, location specific variables as
alternative explanations for land assembly we investigate whether the coefficients for the
hedonic attributes remain robust when estimating spatial versions of the earlier models.
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To make a case for spatial models: Joint count statistics (“same color” statistics larger
than  expectation  at  0.01  confidence  levels)  confirm  a  strong  spatial  dependence  in
redevelopments  of  pairs  of  neighboring  lots,  both  for  the  1832-1860 and the  1832-2015
period. To test the robustness of the regression estimates, we re-estimate Equation (1) as a
spatial autoregressive logistic regression model, explicitly considering spatial dependencies
between neighboring pairs. Specifically, we implement a linearized GMM logit model (Klier
and McMillen, 2008) for a binary dependent variable and an underlying latent variable in a
SAR lag form: 
Y *=ρW Y *+βX+u (2)
The spatial weight matrix W is defined to be 1 for pairs of lots within a distance of 150
meters and 0 otherwise. W is row-normalized and symmetric in terms of non-zero elements. 
VI. Results of the redevelopment prediction analysis
Results  for  the  baseline  logit  regression  model  in  Equation  (1)  and  for  the  spatial
autoregressive model  (2) are  provided in  Tables  3 and 4,  respectively.  Regarding overall
predictive power of the models, we provide McFadden R2s for the logit model in Table 3.
These  show that  the  model  explains  up to  53  percent  of  the  variation  in  redevelopment
activity between 1832 and 1860, and that the social characteristics of the 1832 owners play an
important role in that explanatory power. Interestingly, our model explains up to 27 percent of
redevelopment activity during the 183-year period from 1932 to 2015 even though the model
is necessarily rather simple. Not surprisingly, social factors in 1832 play a lesser role for this
very long time period. 
We  will  discuss  the  results  on  the  individual  variables  reported  in  these  tables
simultaneously below. We first assess the effect of the current value of the combined lot pair.
The 1832 tax value of the combined lot is a proxy for the strike price of the redevelopment
option, so a higher tax value would reduce the likelihood of exercise. This is indeed what we
find: a negative coefficient for the 1832 value in all but one of the model specifications in
Tables 3 and 4. 
=== insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here ===
As Amsterdam developed, the demand for bigger buildings on bigger lots has grown. This
may be due to improved building technology, higher household wealth, larger organizations,
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or the fact that higher buildings tend to have a larger footprint than smaller ones. This implies
that larger lots as of 1832 already were closer to the current optimum, and are therefore less
likely to be combined and redeveloped with neighboring lots. And his is what the data shows.
We find a highly significant negative effect of size on joint redevelopment likelihood, and it
is consistent for the logit and the spatial autoregressive model.10 This results contrasts with
Brooks and Lutz (2016), who find a positive relationship between lot size and the likelihood
of assembly. The cause of this difference may have to do with our sample, which concerns a
historic city center. Despite the land assembly that obviously has been going on, this part of
Amsterdam still looks and feels historic, and large-scale redevelopment has been rare. So
larger lots were more likely to be undisturbed. Brooks and Lutz (2016) and Cunningham
(2012) study US cities, where redevelopment tends to be on a larger scale, and possibly needs
larger parcels to even get started.
But size matters also in a relative sense. The Herfindahl index for lot area describes how
lots in a pair differ in size. If they are very different, it is more likely that one of them has a
suboptimal  size,  which  would  make  it  more  profitable  to  redevelop  the  pair,  and  the
redevelopment option would be worth more. A high Herfindahl implies a big size difference,
so we expect to find a positive relationship with the odds of joint redevelopment. This is
indeed what we see in all model specifications, although the effect is much weaker for the
183-year time period than for the 28-year period. 
We already saw that lot size codetermines the odds of assembly, but a further interesting
result is that shape matters too. We look at the “stretch” of the individual lots, which is a
proxy for a suboptimal lot shape. Putting such a lot together with another lot may bring the
combination closer to the optimum shape, so we would expect a positive relationship between
stretch and the likelihood of redevelopment. And this is what we find. The stretch coefficient
is positive and highly significant in all  specifications,  both in the logit  model and in the
spatial autoregressive model. But it only makes sense to combine a sub-optimally shaped lot
with an adjacent lot if the result is closer to the optimal shape. In other words, if the shape of
a  lot  pair  has  high  stretch  also,  it  would  not  be  very  beneficial  to  make  that  particular
combination. Here also, this intuition is borne out by the results. The stretch of a lot pair has a
negative relationship with the likelihood of their joint redevelopment. That effect is highly
significant in all specifications.
10The magnitude of  the effect  is  as  follows:  A 1 percent increase in  area is  a ~ 0.01 increase in  ln(area,
combined). Multiplied with -0.3 (the coefficient in Table 4, Model 4), the effect is -0.003. The antilog is then
~0.997, so the odds ratio of P(dev)/(1-P(dev)) should be multiplied by 0.997 (or reduced by 0.3%).
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We also look at whether a lot is located in the middle of a block or on its periphery. A
peripheral  location  implies  more  fixed  boundaries  (with  streets  and  canals),  and  less
neighboring lots,  so less possibilities for joint redevelopment with other lots. That means
distance from a block’s center should be negatively related to redevelopment likelihood, and
that is what we find: a negative and significant coefficient in all specifications. We do not
find clear results regarding proximity to water or regarding the percentage of a lot that was
already developed in 1832. 
Just as we found for different lot sizes, if two adjacent lots have different uses, then one
of  these  lots  is  likely  to  have  a  suboptimal  use,  and  this  would  increase  the  chance  of
redevelopment. This notion is borne out by our findings of a negative relationship between
the same use dummy and the development likelihood, although the effect is not very strong,
and not always significant. 
The social effects are also mostly in line with intuition and our a priori reasoning. As we
stated  before,  social  characteristics  may  decrease  or  increase  coordination  costs  for  land
assembly and thereby make exercise of the redevelopment option more or less likely. The
most obvious case of reduced coordination costs is when two adjacent lots have the same
owner. Indeed, we find that this is associated with much better odds of joint redevelopment,
no matter what the model specification is. Interestingly, we even find that the effect is still
positive and significant for the 1832 to 2015 period.
We also find that the likelihood of joint redevelopment goes up when two owners have
the same occupation and/or the same religion. The effect is quite weak for occupation, but
very strong for religion,  both in the logit  model and in the spatial  autoregressive model.
Interestingly, it is even stronger than the effect of the same-owner dummy. Having the same
religion implies being part of the same social network.  This would breed trust  and lower
coordination costs, and would increase the likelihood of a the joint exercise of a profitable
option. As expected, the effect strongly dissipates for the 1832-2015 period. Nevertheless, it
is quite interesting that the religion of neighbors in 1832 does still  have some significant
effect on joint lot redevelopment over the subsequent 183 years!
Regarding  ownership,  we  find  that  lots  occupied  by  the  city  are  more  likely  to  be
assembled. Conversely, owner-occupation reduces the likelihood of assembly. This may be
because assembly would involve more transaction and transition costs for the seller due to the
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need to move. But it is also possible that rental dwellings were in inferior condition relative
to owner-occupied ones, which would make their redevelopment more likely.
The last variables in the regression are dummies describing whether one or both lots’
heads of household were Jewish in 1832. As stated above, we expect that this did not affect
the likelihood of lot  assembly and redevelopment between 1832 and 1860, given that we
already control for religion. However for the period between 1832 and 2015, we expect a
greater  likelihood  of  assembly  for  lots  with  Jewish  owners,  due  to  the  deportation  and
subsequent murder of Amsterdam’s Jewish population during the German occupation. That is
indeed  what  we  find,  and  the  effect  is  strongest  for  lot  pairs  for  which  both  heads  of
household were Jewish in 1832.
Last, the WY variable in the spatial autoregressive model in Table 4 indicates strong and
positive spatial correlation. This implies that redevelopment did not occur in isolation. Often,
more than two lots were combined, and we observe redevelopment hotbeds in the medieval
city center, in the South East, and in the far West, which is in line with what we saw visually
in Figure 3. The suggestion is that changes in highest and best use tend to affect areas or
districts,  rather  than  single  individual  properties.  This  is  in  line  with  recent  findings  by
Munneke and Womack (2015, 2016). Cities are not random collections of atomized lots, but
rather are constellations of districts, neighborhoods, and areas.
As a robustness check of the land assembly consequences of lot size, we also study the
effect non-parametrically. We run Equation (1) again using the full specification as in Model
5, Table 4, with one difference. Instead of including lot size as a continuous variable, we
group all lots in quintiles based on size – with the smallest lots in the first quintile – and
create dummy variables for all 15 pairwise combinations of these quintiles. The regression
coefficients  for  these  dummy  variables  provide  insight  into  the  absolute  and  relative
importance of lot size in all possible assembly pairs. Table 5A provides these coefficients (the
regression coefficients for the other variables are not reported, since these do not markedly
differ from those included in Table 4), and 5B their antilogs. For example, the odds ratio of
two lots from quintile 1 and 2 being developed is exp(-0.10), so only 90.5 percent of the odds
ratio of the base case of two small lots that are both from quintile 1.
=== insert Table 5 about here ===
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Table 5A shows again that larger lots are significantly less likely to be assembled than
smaller ones, and that greater inequality between the lots in any given adjacent pair increases
the likelihood of assembly. The effects are continuous and highly significant.
VII. Concluding remarks
This paper breaks new ground in urban economics by looking at the very long-term
dynamics  of  redevelopment  activity  in  a  major  city,  focusing  in  depth  on  the  specific
characteristics  that  have  influenced  land  assembly  in  Amsterdam during  1832-2015.  We
employ a logit model based on information from 1832 to predict micro developments for the
periods 1832-1860 and 1832-2015. The results are robust to alternative model choices. 
We find that much of the land assembly that has occurred in the last 183 years can be
predicted, and that land owners rationally contemplated “highest and best use” long before it
was ever part of the professional real estate lexicon. Not only the physical characteristics of
the lots, but also the social characteristics of their owners and occupiers in 1832 turn out to be
predictive for the likelihood of assembly,  although the social  characteristics tend to have
explanatory  power  largely  for  the  1832-1860  period  only.  Some  of  the  model’s  salient
variables  underscore  the  relevance  of  real  option  theory  in  our  understanding  of
redevelopment, though a comprehensive and rigorous test of real option theory is beyond the
scope of the present paper. Small lots and lots with suboptimal shapes are more likely to get
redeveloped.  Social  ties  between  owners,  for  example  by  sharing  a  joint  religion  or
profession,  likely  reduce  coordination  costs  for  joint  lot  development,  and therefore  also
increase the odds of redevelopment. Lots that were owned by Jewish citizens in 1832 are
significantly more likely to be assembled in 2015, probably because of the World War II
genocide.
Probably  the  most  important  lesson  of  this  paper  is  that  land  assembly  should
preferably be studied by analyzing both individual and combined inner-city lots. This is in
line  with  how urban  redevelopment  actually  takes  place,  and  our  results  show that  this
approach is warranted by the data. Moreover, our results imply that it is important to take
account of social characteristics of lot owners besides just the physical characteristics of the
lots. 
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Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Property Values in 1832 Central Amsterdam
Percentile < 10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 > 90
Notes: The map shows a snapshot of property rental value based on rents that were assessed by the city for tax
reasons, for rental properties and owner-occupied properties alike. The rental values are divided by the property
footprint, to account for different building sizes. The source is the 1832 cadastral map of Amsterdam. 
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Figure 2: Example of lot-by-lot land assembly for one block on the Herengracht canal
1832 1860 2015
Notes: This figure displays the evolution of land assembly at the example of a single block on the Herengracht
canal. The North-East side of this block faces the canal. While many lots today still feature the same boundaries
as in 1832, a clear trend towards larger lots by combining multiple smaller lots can be observed. Historically,
block-wide redevelopments only rarely occurred in Amsterdam.
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Figure 3: Estimated Density Plots of Lot Areas, 1832 versus 2015
Notes: Over the last 180 years, the distribution of lot size in central Amsterdam has shifted
towards significantly larger lots, as visualized by the estimated density functions of lots size
above. In 1832 (solid line), half of the lots were smaller than 68.5 m2. By 2015 (dashed
line), the median of lot size reaches 105.9 m2. Exceptionally large lots of 400 m2 or more
remain uncommon 
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Figure 4: Pairwise lot redevelopments
1832-1860 1832-2015
Notes: These maps provide information on the pairwise redevelopment of lots between 1832 and 1860, and
between 1832 and 2015. Redeveloped lots are denoted in red, unchanged lots in blue. The maps are based on
Amsterdam’s cadastral maps for 1832, 1860, and 2015.
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Table 1: Lot and Building Characteristics, 1832 versus 2015
Variable Year 25th percentile Median Mean 75th percentile SD
Lot area (m2) 1832 37.9 68.5 121 128.8 152.9
2015 65.6 105.9 173.9 205.6 178.7
Building footprint (m2) 1832 27.6 46.1 67.2 76.2 125.4
2015 50.2 79.5 172.1 138.8 555.3
Developed area (% of lot) 1832 58.1% 90.7% 76.5% 100.0% 30.3%
2015 63.7% 89.1% 77.5% 98.8% 26.6%
Stretch (perimeter2/area) 1832 17.5 21 23.6 26.6 8.7
2015 18.6 21.9 23.9 26.9 7.5
# neighboring lots 1832 3 4 4.3 5 2.1
2015 2 3 3.7 5 1.7
Notes: This table compares characteristics of buildings and lots in Amsterdam’s city center for
1832 and 2015, based on the cadastral maps for these years.
.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Pairs of Neighboring Lots
Variable Min Mean Median Max SD
A. Structural Characteristics
Joint development 1832-1860 0 0.02 0 1 0.14
Joint development 1832-2015 0 0.42 0 1 0.49
log(# neighboring lots, combined lot) 0 2.19 2.20 3.04 0.40
log(tax value 1832, combined lot) 0 5.52 5.75 8.23 1.34
log(area, combined lot) 2.06 5.07 4.98 10.72 0.88
Lot area, Herfindahl index 0.49 0.58 0.53 1 0.11
Stretch, avg. for individual lots 2.75 3.15 3.11 4.96 0.27
Stretch, combined lot 2.59 3.40 3.39 6.26 0.44
Share area developed, combined lot 0 0.77 0.86 1 0.25
Share of perimeter close to water, 
combined lot 0 0.32 0 1 0.57
Same land use type, two lots 0 0.73 1 1 0.44
B. Social Characteristics
Same owner 0 0.16 0 1 0.37
Same occupation 0 0.14 0 1 0.35
Same religion, head of household 0 0.33 0 1 0.47
# lots with Jewish head of household 0 0.13 0 2 0.43
# lots owned by city 0 0.03 0 2 0.20
# lots owner occupied 0 0.46 0 2 0.64
Notes:  Overall,  59,468 unique combinations of neighboring lots exist  in
1832. This table provides pairwise and individual information regarding the
structural state of the lots, as well as social characteristics of the head of the
household occupying the dwelling built on the lot. Data are from the 1832,
1860 and 2015 cadastral maps. The base year is always 1832. The dummy
variables indicating same occupation or same religion are orthogonalized to
the variable indicating  same owner: They are defined 1 for pairs of lots
where the owner is not the same but the the heads of household belong to
the  same  denomination  or  the  owners  have  the  same  occupation,
respectively, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 3: Logit Regression Estimates for Joint Redevelopment of Neighboring Lots
Variable 1832–1860 1832–2015  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val.
ln(# neighboring 
lots, combined)
-0.30 0.05* -0.37 0.02** -0.39 0.02** 0.21 0.00*** 0.20 0.00***
(0.74) (0.69) (0.68) (1.23) (1.23)
ln(tax value 1832,
combined)
-0.20 0.00*** 0.03 0.68 0.01 0.90 -0.10 0.00*** -0.06 0.00***
(0.82) (1.03) (1.01) (0.91) (0.95)
ln(area, 
combined)
-0.52 0.00*** -0.44 0.00*** -0.42 0.00*** -0.69 0.00*** -0.63 0.00***
(0.54) (0.65) (0.66) (0.50) (0.53)
Lot area, 
Herfindahl index
4.70 0.00*** 3.86 0.00*** 3.91 0.00*** 1.06 0.00*** 0.78 0.00***
(109.41) (47.49) (50.09) (2.90) (2.18)
Avg. stretch, 
individual lots
1.73 0.00*** 1.09 0.00*** 1.09 0.00*** 1.13 0.00*** 0.97 0.00***
(5.66) (2.97) (2.98) (3.10) (2.63)
Stretch, 
combined lot
-2.00 0.00*** -1.42 0.00*** -1.42 0.00*** -1.58 0.00*** -1.39 0.00***
(0.14) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.25)
% area developed,
combined
-0.22 0.43 -0.34 0.23 -0.32 0.26 -0.13 0.09. -0.12 0.13
(0.80) (0.71) (0.73) (0.88) (0.89)
Share of 
perimeter close to
water
0.12 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.15 -0.18 0.00*** -0.17 0.00***
(1.13) (1.15) (1.15) (0.84) (0.84)
Same use type 0.18 0.09. 0.12 0.34 0.11 0.40 -0.02 0.39 -0.03 0.34
(1.20) (1.13) (1.11) (0.98) (0.97)
Same owner 4.17 0.00*** 4.21 0.00*** 1.17 0.00***
(64.43) (67.54) (3.23)
Same occupation 0.17 0.52 0.16 0.53 0.24 0.00***
(1.18) (1.18) (1.27)
Same religion, 
head of household
3.55 0.00*** 3.61 0.00*** 0.02 0.32
(34.93) (36.88) (1.03)
Owner occupier: 
1 lot
-0.20 0.20 -0.22 0.17 0.06 0.02**
(0.82) (0.80) (1.06)
Owner occupier: 
2 lots
0.15 0.56 0.14 0.59 0.01 0.85
(1.16) (1.15) (1.01)
Owned by city: 1 
lot
1.12 0.00*** 1.08 0.00*** 0.25 0.00***
(3.05) (2.95) (1.28)
Owned by city: 2 
lots
1.61 0.00*** 1.52 0.00*** -0.21 0.30
(4.99) (4.59) (0.81)
Owner Jewish: 1 
lot
-16.88 0.00*** 0.08 0.23
(0.00) (1.08)
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Owner Jewish: 2 
lots
-2.17 0.00*** 0.26 0.00***
(0.11) (1.30)
Intercept and 
block fixed 
effects
YES YES YES YES YES
McFadden 
pseudo-R2
0.44 0.53 0.53 0.25 0.27
Notes: This table provides results for logistic regression estimates based on Equation (1). The number
of observations is 59,468. Spatial dummy variables are based on 647 blocks in 1832. Odds-ratios (in
parentheses) are calculated as the antilog of the coefficients. Stars (***,**,*) mark significance at 1%,
5% and 10% confidence levels.
28
Table 4: Spatial Logit Regression Estimates for Joint Redevelopment of Neighboring Lots
Variable 1832–1860 1832–2015
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. P-Val.
ln(# neighboring 
lots, combined)
-0.14 0.22 -0.20 0.06* 0.10 0.00*** 0.08 0.01** 0.11 0.00***
(0.87) (0.82) (1.11) (1.08) (1.12)
ln(tax value 
1832, comb.)
-0.10 0.01** 0.03 0.50 -0.13 0.00*** -0.18 0.00*** -0.13 0.00***
(0.90) (1.03) (0.88) (0.84) (0.88)
ln(area, comb.) -0.31 0.00*** -0.29 0.00*** -0.37 0.00*** -0.40 0.00*** -0.35 0.00***
(0.73) (0.75) (0.69) (0.67) (0.70)
Lot area, 
Herfindahl index
3.64 0.00*** 3.30 0.00*** 0.88 0.00*** 1.27 0.00*** 0.87 0.00***
(38.09) (27.11) (2.41) (3.56) (2.39)
Avg. stretch, 
individual lots
0.95 0.00*** 0.82 0.00*** 0.85 0.00*** 0.98 0.00*** 0.83 0.00***
(2.59) (2.27) (2.34) (2.66) (2.29)
Stretch, 
combined lot
-1.53 0.00*** -1.26 0.00*** -1.09 0.00*** -1.25 0.00*** -1.08 0.00***
(0.22) (0.28) (0.34) (0.29) (0.34)
% area 
developed, comb.
0.15 0.52 0.09 0.66 -0.12 0.06* -0.12 0.05** -0.08 0.18
(1.16) (1.09) (0.89) (0.89) (0.92)
Share of 
perimeter close 
to water
-0.05 0.41 -0.08 0.30 -0.10 0.00*** -0.10 0.00*** -0.09 0.00***
(0.95) (0.92) (0.90) (0.90) (0.91)
Same use type 0.05 0.60 -0.10 0.33 -0.06 0.01** -0.07 0.01*** -0.07 0.00***
(1.05) (0.90) (0.94) (0.93) (0.93)
Same owner 5.67 0.00*** 0.96 0.00*** 0.96 0.00***
(290.0) (2.61) (2.61)
Same occupation 0.73 0.00*** 0.23 0.00*** 0.23 0.00***
(2.08) (1.26) (1.26)
Same religion, 
head of 
household
5.33 0.00*** 0.08 0.00*** 0.06 0.01**
(206.4) (1.08) (1.06)
Owner occupier: 
1 lot
-0.39 0.01*** 0.02 0.47 0.03 0.25
(0.68) (1.02) (1.03)
Owner occupier: 
2 lots
-0.18 0.45 -0.05 0.16 -0.04 0.32
(0.84) (0.95) (0.96)
Owned by city: 1
lot
0.99 0.00*** 0.16 0.01** 0.15 0.01**
(2.69) (1.17) (1.16)
Owned by city: 2
lots
0.55 0.04** -0.21 0.25 -0.22 0.24
(1.73) (0.81) (0.80)
Owner Jewish: 1 
lot
n.a. 0.22 0.00***
(1.25)
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Owner Jewish: 2 
lots
-0.45 0.26 0.46 0.00***
(0.64) (1.58)
Intercept and 
neighborhood 
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES
WY 0.69 0.00*** 0.38 0.00*** 0.42 0.00*** 0.40 0.00*** 0.44 0.00***
Notes: This table provides results for the Klier-McMillen (2008) linearized GMM logit model for a 0-
1 dependent variable and an underlying latent variable of the form  Y* = ρ WY* + X β + u. Estimated
using  the  “spgmm/logit”-procedure  from  McMillen's  (2015)  SparseProbit-package  for  the  R
environment  (McMillen, 2015). The number of observations is 59,468. Odds-ratios in parentheses.
Stars (***,**,*) mark significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels.
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Table 5: Nonparametric modeling of lot size-effect on joint redevelopment odds ratio
Quintile area, Lot 1 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
a) Regression coefficients
Quintile area, 
Lot 2
Quintile 2 -0.10 * -0.32 ***
(0.05) (0.00)
Quintile 3 -0.43 *** -0.61 *** -0.93 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quintile 4 -0.69 *** -0.92 *** -1.12 *** -1.29 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quintile 5 -0.92 *** -1.07 *** -1.25 *** -1.36 *** -1.55 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
b) Antilogs of regression coefficients
Quintile 2 90.5% 72.6%
Quintile 3 65.1% 54.3% 39.5%
Quintile 4 50.2% 39.9% 32.6% 27.5%
Quintile 5 39.9% 34.3% 28.7% 25.7% 21.2%
Notes: The table presents coefficients and p values  (in parentheses) from an estimation of Equation 1.
In this variant, the size of the two lots is not captured by one continuous variable (as in e.g. Model 5,
Table 4).  Instead, the individual lots are classified by their size quintile and dummy variables are
assigned to the 15 unordered combinations of quintiles. The coefficients for other hedonic and social
attributes are not reported.
The odds ratio of  two neighboring lots from quintile 1 and 2 being developed is exp(-0.10) or only
90.5% of the odds ratio of the base case of two small lots both from quintile 1. For two large lots from
quintile 5, the odds ratio is only 21.2% of the base case. The average lot size per quintile (m 2) are
21.9, 41.4, 66.0, 103.7, and 361.8, respectively.   
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